IKE Session Resumption draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2resumption-03

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Main Changes in -03

- Changed from 1 round trip resumption for 2 round trips
- This is the big one, but also:
 - Clarified which state is resumed from ticket and which is renegotiated
 - Clarified use of identities
 - Added discussion of ticket lifetime and reissue, as discussed in SFO
 - Discussed NAT and IP address change
 - And several more...



- 1 RT barebones IKE_SESSION_RESUME followed by a regular IKE_AUTH
 - IKE_SESSION_RESUME behaves like IKE_SA_INIT

```
HDR, Ni, N(TICKET_OPAQUE) [,N+] \rightarrow
```

```
\leftarrow HDR, Nr [,N+]
```

The new IKE SA is created at this point
Derivation similar to IKE SA rekey

SKEYSEED = prf(SK_d_old, "Resumption" | Ni | Nr)

Resumed vs. New State (1/2)

- Very little state in the ticket
- 2 round trips means that most (non-IKE SA) state can be exchanged normally
- Some stuff left unspecified
 - Next slide
- Internal IP address is another important special case

Resumed vs. New State (2/2)

IDi

IDr

Authentication method

Certificates (when applicable)

Local IP address/port, peer IP address/port

NAT detection status

SPIs

Which peer is the "original initiator"?

IKE SA sequence numbers

IKE SA algorithms (SAr)

IKE SA keys (SK_*)

IKE SA window size

Child SAs (ESP/AH)

Internal IP address

Other Configuration Payload information

Peer vendor IDs

Peer supports MOBIKE

MOBIKE additional addresses

Time until re-authentication [RFC4478]

Peer supports redirects

Source IP Address and NAT

Client can resume from a new address
Return routability ensured by 2nd RT
NAT is detected (again) upon resumption

Identities

IDr is renegotiated

- But gateway should store IDr in ticket, and may use it for policy decisions on resumption
- IDi is included in the ticket and in the exchange
 - Protected in IKE_AUTH
 - Both occurrences MUST be identical

